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Series Preface
The Complex Dispute Resolution series collects essays on the development of foundational
dispute resolution theory and practice and its application to increasingly more complex settings
of conflicts in the world, including multi-party and multi-issue decision-making, negotiations
in political policy formation and governance, and international conflict resolution.
Each volume contains an introduction by the editor, which explores the key issues in the
field. All three volumes feature essays which span an interdisciplinary range of fields - law,
political science, game theory, decision science, economics, social and cognitive psychology,
sociology and anthropology - and consider issues in the uses of informal and private as well
as more formal and public processes. The essays also question whether the development of
universal theoretical insights about conflict resolution is possible with variable numbers of
parties and issues and in multicultural settings.
Taken together, the three volumes in this series present classic research essays on all aspects
ofcomplex dispute resolution and constitute an invaluable reference resource for libraries and
academics in political decision-making, human rights, international relations and business
and commercial law.
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Introduction
'If two heads are better than one, are three heads better than two?'
Anon.
Foundational Theory
All theories, but especially all social theories, are historically contingent or are at least
situated in particular eras, with particular issues in contest. Much modern dispute and
conflict resolution theory was initially developed through efforts made during the Cold War
to study the conflicts between two axes of power, which inspired modern game theory, as
well as through other efforts to understand the strategies to be used in 'two-party' contests of
competition (and, later, coordination and cooperation, as well). It is probably no coincidence
that the prize-winning game theory (Nash, 1950, 1953; Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Schelling,
1960), which initially focused on two-party strategic actions, was so evocative in the
development of modern negotiation theory for, among others, lawyers and legal disputes
and conflicts. Assumptions of scarce resources - for example, money, land, water and other
resources including people, such as children in family custody disputes - that needed to be
divided by two sides in conflict led to behavioural assumptions or prescriptive advice about
how to 'distribute' such scarce resources between two 'warring' or 'competing' parties. Thus
was born most conventional adversarial negotiation and dispute resolution theory - how one
might best 'defeat' or 'maximize gain' against another single party, especially with lawsuits
structured around plaintiff versus defendant.
From the late 1960s through the 1990s such assumptions of distributional allocation in
dispute resolution were challenged, revisited and reassessed by a number of legal scholars
(Fisher and Ury, 1981; Menkel-Meadow, 1984), psychologists (Rubin and Brown, 1975),
anthropologists (Gulliver, 1979), economists, labour-management scholars (Walton and
McKersie, 1965), decision scientists (Raiffa, 1982), and policy and city planners (Susskind,
Richardson and Hildebrand, 1978), who mined conflicts and disputes for possibilities and
opportunities for more optimistic 'mutual gain'. Although much of this work pre-dated the
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the more optimistic theories of the 1970s and 1980s suggested
that not all negotiations had to result in binary win-lose or individual maximization outcomes.
Rather, as suggested by the earlier work ofMary Parker Follett in the 1920s, (Follett, 1995),
it was possible that when parties were in conflict they could 'integrate' their needs and
interests by looking for trades of desired items, or by focusing on complementary, rather than
conflicting, needs and interests. In Follett's classic stories, two sisters competing over a single
orange learn that one wants the fruit and the other the rind (for cooking) or that temperature
in a library can be regulated by opening a window in another room to avoid an undesirable
direct draught (Kolb, 1995).
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These 'solutions' to problems of conflict reveal that, by exploring underlying needs and
interests, parties can search for creative ways of 'expanding' the resources they are seemingly
competing over, or they may learn that because they value things differently, rather than in the
same way, they can achieve 'gains by trade'. This more optimistic focus on creative solutions to
situations of conflict (Menkel-Meadow, 2001a) has not only spawned a new interdisciplinary
approach to conflict-handling, but has also inspired rigorous technical and humanistic study
(as 'science' and 'art') of both the cognitive and behavioural aspects of conflict resolution.
These theories built on a (at least temporarily) more optimistic view of international, business,
legal and interpersonal relations which suggested that 'creating value' could be a just as likely
negotiation outcome as destroying value in hard-fought and 'negative sum' high transaction-
cost negotiations (Menkel-Meadow, 2006a, 2009). With the use of creative problem-solving
by mediators, even highly contested family disputes led to a new outcome of 'shared' joint
custody of children, rather than making one parent a custodial parent and granting the other
only visitation rights as dictated by law. In international relations, the Sinai Peninsula was
returned to Egyptian sovereignty, while maintaining Israeli security, by demilitarization and
some neutralization of the land. Thus, more integrative approaches to negotiation have led
to more creative, flexible, contingent (and therefore capable of being revisited) and sharing
solutions.
Negotiation theorists and practitioners hoped to create a 'brave new world' of conflict and
dispute resolution, as well as new approaches to joint-gain transactions and organizational
creation. Some negotiation theorists and practitioners - lawyers among them - rethought
how negotiated processes could actually lead to more substantive and procedural justice
and fairness, as well as direct party participation in decision-making and policy formation
(Menkel-Meadow, 1995, 2006b).
In the last few decades both legal scholars and practitioners have recognized that very
few legal disputes have only two parties. Even the conventional plaintiff-defendant case
in tort or contract often involves insurers, employees, suppliers, vendors, family members,
partners in business or personal lives, so that almost no lawsuits are only 'two-party' conflicts.
Virtually all legal matters implicate and involve more than two parties to the dispute, whether
legally liable, or financially or socially affected by any resolution of a particular dispute.
Modern forms of aggregate litigation (Burch, 2011), both in formal class actions or in less
formal methods of group litigation, also require analysis as events of multi-party dispute
resolution. Modem mass torts and disasters (such as environmental disasters, medical device
malfunctions, 9/11 in the United States, 7 July 2007 in the UK and the BP oil spill in US
waters) have spawned new forms of mass claims resolution, which include new forms of
formal litigation and, more importantly, new forms of formal and informal claims resolution
without courts. The recognition that some disputes or conflicts are iterative and repetitive
within and among organizations (such as business and employment disputes) or involve
hundreds or thousands of claimants (securities and consumer disputes, mass torts) has also
spawned new approaches to dispute resolution called dispute system design or management
ofmultiple repeat classes of disputes.
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The Problem of Numbers: New Theory
As reviewed in Volume I, the outpouring of both intellectual and practical work in this new
field of negotiation and conflict resolution produced a canon of new concepts to be explored
and tested in both laboratories and real-world situations. It was not long before Howard Raiffa,
a mathematician turned decision scientist and negotiation theorist, and others began to notice
that numbers matter (Raiffa et al., 2002). And numbers matter in important and different
ways. The number of parties quickly challenged some of the basic canonical concepts in
conflict resolution theory and practice:
� What happens to BATNAs {best alternatives to negotiated agreements) or WATNAs
{worst alternatives to negotiated agreements) when there are more than two parties
and there may be many more possible alternative arrangements (with some, but not
all, of the parties involved)?
� How can ZOPAs {zones ofpossible agreement) be mapped on a two-dimensional
playing field (or piece of paper) when adding parties to the mix makes many
multidimensional zones possible?
� What happens when those ZOPAs do not overlap with all of the parties, but only with
some?
� While two-party negotiations can be successfully accounted for by the concept of
"consent" or agreement when there is, by definition, no agreement ifone party refuses
to agree, what happens in a multi-party setting when some, but not all, consent?
By what measure (or voting or decision rule) do we determine whether there is an
agreement in a multi-party setting? Consensus, all, most, majority, plurality?
� What are the dangers in any agreement reached by only a few of the parties when
others seek to sabotage the agreement (vetoes, 'hold-outs', saboteurs, defectors)?
� How is enforcement of, or compliance with, a multi-party agreement to be achieved?
How might this be different from a two-party agreement?
� What happens when parties form coalitions or alliances to engage in group action and
what happens when, after agreements to cooperate in such alliances are defected on,
there is betrayal or defection! How are coalitions and alliances disciplined? How do
we measure trust in multi-party situations? How stable are alliances and coalitions
in multi-party settings?
� How are information-sharing strategies complexified when there are more than
two parties asking for or giving information? What if information is distributed
differentially to the parties?
� Power imbalances are difficult enough to manage in two-party settings, so what
happens when there are power differentials among numbers of parties? Consider,
in international negotiations, the developed and developing nations, the oil-rich and
resource-poor, coastal versus inland nations and so on. And, within nations, consider
indigenous groups versus settlers or colonizers or multi-ethnic/religious or other
'cultural' differences. Within more conventional lawsuits, consider the differences
between those who can afford representation with resources and those who have
none, as well as those between labour andmanagement, differently endowed partners
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in partnership dissolutions, creditors and debtors and so on.
� How does the role of third-party facilitators or helpers (mediators, arbitrators, even
judges) change in conflicts or disputes with more than two parties? Consider the
management of group or class litigation now allowed in many legal systems,
mediation of multi-party environmental, community or regulatory disputes and
facilitation of complex policy formation and implementation.
� Does it matter whether the parties have iterative (ongoing, repeat) relationships with
each other or are simply dealing with a one-shot issue?
� What are different groups and parties like internally! Who makes decisions for each
party? A single leader? A constituency with or without clear voting procedures?
� Who is the representative or agent (Mnookin, Susskind and Foster, 1 999) ofeach party
and what are they authorized to do? How do we know when a party or group has
'agreed' to something? What happens when a party or group has internal dissension!
How can even single parties become multiple parties with negotiations that are both
'across the table' and 'behind the table' (with constituents) (Mnookin, Peppet and
Tulumello, 2000)?
� Who talks when? How are complex multi-party or group negotiations structured?
What processes are possible? Helpful, destructive?
Howard Raiffa, alongwith his colleagues at Harvard's innovative Program on Negotiation,
including Nobel laureate Thomas Schelling, began (but never quite finished) an evocative
questioning ofhow numbers ofparties in negotiation might help us develop a fully elaborated
theory (and practice) related to the number of participants in a negotiation. Beginning with
the intrapersonal negotiations that we all have with ourselves - 'Should I do x or not? What
happens when I want to do x, but instead do y?' (known as cognitive dissonance) - we can
look at different conditions of negotiation when there is an n of 2 (conventional two-party
negotiation), n of 3 (two negotiators with a mediator or other third-party assistant), n of 5
(parties, lawyers or other representatives and a third party), more than 5, and ultimately
more than 100 (most international negotiations, like most treaty negotiations nowadays, may
involve as many as 200 negotiators and maybe more if one considers, as we do later in this
volume, the negotiations of a full polity in democratic deliberation (Part III) or even larger,
'global' negotiations). Raiffa (like most of us who undertake practical work in these fields)
has concluded that there are some sharp breaking-points in the conduct and process of conflict
resolution with different numbers of negotiators. If there are more than about 100 people
in a room, people do not really listen to each other without clear process management and
amplification of attention, and any group of over 30 people suffers a reduction in individual
participation (ask any teacher!). The number of participants in a group affects consensus-
building, dissent, and disciplining of both individual and group behaviour as the essays in
Parts I and II of this volume demonstrate (see Mnookin, Chapter 1; Sunstein, Chapter 4,
Elster, Chapter 5 and Thompson, Chapter 6).
The number of issues may further complicate the questions above. In some situations, the
more issues the merrier (since more issues means that trades are more likely to forge more
integrative agreements); in other cases, if there are too many issues it might be more difficult
to trade, especially if the various parties value those issues differently. Although some have
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suggested complex metrics for quantifying preferences in complex negotiations (Brams and
Taylor, 1 996), the number of issues tends to (although not always) increase with the number
of parties and this makes negotiation structure and management of both process and outcome
more difficult (Lax and Sebenius, 2006):
� Should one start with the easiest issues or the most difficult?
� Should all parties be present for all discussions ofall issues? When are private caucuses
appropriate/dangerous? Is transparency in negotiation always advantageous? When
not?
� Should one go to parties in agreement first (those who are 'with us')? Or should we
try to win over our most difficult 'enemies' first? What are more optimal ways of
sequencing multi-party negotiations (see Sebenius, Chapter 3, this volume)?
� Is trading or 'log-rolling' with some, but not all, of the parties permissible?
� Can issues not formally on the 'agenda' be used privately or with just a few parties,
without involving everyone? Howpublic or transparent should the agenda formulti
party negotiations be?
� Must there be agreement on all contested issues for there to be an agreement at all?
� Are all issues equally important? How shouldpriorities be established with differential
utilities or valuations by different parties in 'mixed' 'co-opetition' situations
(Brandenberger and Nalebuff, 1 996)?
� How can parties assure 'fair divisions' (Brams and Taylor, 2000) among many
parties when allocating values (especially when the parties may have differential
endowments and/or needs)? Are all issues for division quantifiable! Divisible!
Commensurable! What do we do with non-material issues?
� How are monetary and material issues to be compared to (traded with) non-material
desiderata (for example, identity, respect, dignity needs and values - the problem of
incommensurability).
All of these issues (and more) suggest that much of the theory developed with two-party
negotiation, even with the assistance of third-party facilitators (like mediators), may have to
be re-examined in the different contexts ofmore than two or three parties. The complexities
of these issues has led to the development of other new applied fields of research, study and
practice - decision sciences, deliberative democracy, strategic planning and group facilitation.
The Challenges ofGroup Negotiations
When negotiations occur in settings of groups (even when there are only two groups in a
more conventional, 'two-party, one issue' distributional setting) there are issues of group
behaviour or 'groupthink' (Janis, 1982; Sunstein, Chapter 4, this volume) which can be
enacted in different ways and affect the processes and outcomes of negotiation. Groups can
come closer to each other or move each other to more extreme positions. They can fracture
and cease to be a single cohesive group at all. Or, while remaining a group for negotiation or
conflict resolution purposes (imagine a labour and management dispute, for example) they
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can have several subgroups or issue-related constituencies. Representation of group interests
is quite complex in even the simplest of negotiation settings, but all of this becomes even
more complex when there are many groups in a negotiation, as is the case in all international
negotiations, whether about war and peace, general diplomacy, trade, environmental issues,
cooperation in joint ventures to eliminate or reduce threats (like terrorism and health), or
joint efforts to engage in positive human endeavours (poverty reduction, resource exploration,
cultural exchanges.) Volume III in this series will focus specifically on international conflict
resolution processes.
Groups must decide how the> will proceed in a conflict resolution setting - how to select
representatives, how to hold them accountable, how to decide when and how concessions,
offers and proposals are to be made and agreements reached. Thus, every negotiation or
conflict setting which involves groups contains negotiations within the group, as well as
with whatever parties the group is negotiating with. Although human beings need to work in
collectivities to accomplish many of their aims, work in groups is difficult and clearly requires
theory, management and feedback through study and adjustment.
From the earliest days of sociology and social ps> chology. the fields of human behaviour
have recognized that one cannot simply aggregate individual human preferences and
behaviours (Cohen, 2009). Groups themselves produce their own behaviours and dynamics
(Simmel, 1 955; Pruitt and Kim, 2004). To the extent that a vast literature has now developed on
cognitive and social errors in decision-making and judgement in the behaviour of individuals
(Bazerman, 2005), studies in behavioural psychology and social reasoning, in both laboratory
and real settings (Tversky and Kahneman. 1974), are expanding our knowledge about how
'non-rational' choices and behaviours alter what more "rational' analysts of human behaviour
have predicted (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986; Arrow, Mnookin and Tversky. 1995).
changing the very nature of what is considered "rational" behaviour in group and conflict
situations (Cohen, 20 1 1 ; Mercier and Sperber, 201 1). Instead ofpredicting or suggesting what
'should' rationally happen in negotiated situations (prescriptive perspectives on negotiation,
with assumptions of rationality), we are now more likely to look empirically at what actually
does happen in negotiations (descriptions of conflict resolution), especially after some of the
assumptions of 'rationality' have been subjected to feminist and postmodernist critiques of
the assumptions of 'universalism' and "rationality ' (Menkel-Meadow, 2001b and Chapter 7.
Volume I; Young, 2002).
As scholarship and practice in negotiation and conflict resolution became more
sophisticated and argued for a "scaling up' of insights from the basic dyadic negotiation
to group decision-making and deliberation about policy in the larger polity, the field of
conflict resolution joined with developments in political science to form a new applied (and
theoretical) field of deliberative democracy (Dispute Resolution Magazine, 2006, pp. 5-27:
Cohen, 2009). The questions, first framed by political and social philosophers like Jurgen
Habermas (1984, 1987), Stuart Hampshire (2000), Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson
(1996) and Amartya Sen (2009), seek to explore how knowledge about conflict resolution,
group and aggregated decision-making can be employed to provide for the best possible - but
not the 'best' or 'perfect' (Elster, Chapter 5. this volume) - processes for policy formation in
democratic societies (see Part V, this volume).
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Efforts and Problems in Deliberative Democracy and Decision-Making as Multi-Party
Negotiations
As originally conceptualized by political theorists, deliberative democracy focuses on the
idea that there should be maximum participation in rule- and law-making by those who are
affected by the rules and laws made by any polity. Although most political theorists have
focused on the role of rationality or reasonedpersuasion as the principal mode of decision
making in democracy, more recent work in political decision-making has concentrated on the
'a-rational' in terms of not only affective, emotional, ethical and communitarian (or value-
based and religious) modes of belief and opinion (Elster, 1999), but also more instrumental
and practical forms ofpreference bargaining or trading in how decisions are reached in groups
(Menkel-Meadow, Chapters 13 and 18, this volume; Susskind and Cruickshank, 1987). The
modern challenge for the field of democratic decision-making is how to combine different
modes of discourse to form processes that permit these different modes to simultaneously
contribute to group decision-making, making the decisions reached more legitimate and
acceptable to the many who are affected by them.
Deliberative democracy has begun to combine theory with practice (Kahane, Weinstock,
Leydet and Williams, 2010; Gastil and Levine, 2005; Susskind, McKearnan and Thomas-
Larmer, 1 999) by examining the insights ofmulti-party dispute resolution and applying them
to settings of group decision-making in the polity, whether in situations of general legislation
and regulation or in more specific forms of conflict resolution and policy-making (as in
strategic planning, environmental, community, health, budget allocations and multicultural
disputes), as well as in any group governance situation (such as faculty meetings, corporate
governance and non-profit organizations). Through this work, identification of different
modes of decision-making or process pluralism has allowed both theorists and practitioners
to structure different kinds of group decision-making processes for different purposes. Thus,
the field is now more often called 'appropriate', rather than 'alternative', dispute resolution.
Methods of engagement in multi-party conflict resolution can vary from learning events
like facilitated dialogue in which parties explore different perspectives on highly contested
issues such as immigration policy, gun control, abortion, nuclear power and so on (see, for
example, the Public Conversations Project at http://www.publicconversations.org) without
coming to any particular conclusion or outcome other than mutual understanding, to formal
debates in which parties simplify issues, often to only two sides, to hear argumentation and to
vote or declare 'right or wrong' or a 'victor' on a particular issue, and to decisional processes,
such as public policy consensus-building (see, for example, the Consensus Building Institute
at http://www.cbuilding.org and America Speaks at http://www.americaspeaks.org) in which
facilitated discussion, brainstorming, fact-finding and voting procedures can result in final (or
advisory) outcomes for governmental bodies (Susskind and Cruikshank, 2006).
These efforts to enhance civic engagement in political decision-making attempt to combine
discourses of reasoned persuasion, instrumental bargaining and trading of interests, and
preferences and appeals to affective, emotional and ethical concerns, as well as to facilitate
joint fact-finding and information acquisition.
Many of these processes are conducted in public, formally sponsored settings as in
American 'negotiated rule-making' involving all stakeholders in regulatory drafting, with
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expert facilitators (an expansion of the mediator role discussed in Volume I). Others may be
privately sponsored (as when large organizations seek to take the 'pulse' of a local community
for some development project). Still others may be jointly (public and privately) sponsored
(as when America Speaks facilitated a mass town-hall forum meeting of over 4,000 citizen
attendees to discuss possible plans for the redevelopment of the 'Ground Zero' site after the
destruction of the World Trade Center in New York on 9/11 and a Global Forum at the 2005
World Economic Forum at Davos to identify the key issues facing the global community).
Governmental bodies may sponsor such meetings to gain bipartisan (or non-partisan in
more diverse political party settings) assessments ofpolitical priorities, as in healthcare issues
in the United States or economic or immigration policies in the EU. Combining informal
meetings, facilitated small-group or focus group discussions with modern technology (use
of computers for real-time polling) and even online discussions, these multiple methods of
obtaining input and feedback in deliberation about policy have expanded and broadened the
ways in which citizens can influence their governments and each other. In another form of
multi-party political engagement, James Fishkin (2009) has pioneered deliberative polling in
which a group of 'representative' citizens gather to deliberate, after receiving non-partisan
factual information, and answer questions about policy matters over a full day or weekend
of engagement, removed from more formal voting and also from uninformed spot opinion
polling.
Multi-party negotiation theory provides the background againstwhich parties to such events
must decide on process ground rules (who may speak when, who is a proper representative
of a particular constituency, what kinds of information should be discovered and shared) and
decision rules for achieving a vote or agreement on an outcome. Expert facilitators of such
events draw from mediation theory and practice (Menkel-Meadow, 2002) as well as from
recent literature on the management ofmeetings (Schwarz, 2002), to structure, plan and guide
large-group deliberation.
As the essays in Part II of this volume elucidate, voting rules for multi-party or group
decision-making can be quite complex and require the facilitation and advice of those who
are expert in the consequences of different voting choices - unanimity, supermajorities,
consensus, simple majority and plurality - as decision rules all produce different kinds of
processes and outcomes. Consider the different outcomes that might be achieved if everyone
must agree or if only a simple majority must agree (allowing more dissent and perhaps more
non-conventional, but possibly risky or contentious, outcomes).
Deciding who gets to participate (who are the stakeholders in any particular matter) and
how is also part of the design of any multi-party process. Should insurers participate in any
legal settlement discussion? Should children be consulted in divorce proceedings? How are
future generations to be represented in environmental negotiations? These are all questions
that implicate the ethics of practice in the multi-party dispute resolution field (Menkel-
Meadow and Wheeler, 2004; Waldman, 2011). In many settings (for example, the treaty
negotiation and formation processes discussed in Volume III) there may also be formal legal
requirements for when such deliberative democracy events can have legal effect (ratification
rules, necessity of approval by formal governmental body).
These efforts to combine deliberative democracy theory with conflict resolution practice
are new and evolving. As constituted and used in a great variety of settings, there are also
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critiques of such efforts. Iris Young (2002), among others (for example, Wilde, 2000, p.
238: 'the problem with socialism is that it takes up too many evenings'), has queried who
will have time to participate in such events (not workers, not those with primary childcare
responsibilities, not those without sufficient education or resources to participate). As a
matter of democratic theory some have questioned how expertly facilitated meetings and
negotiations can be justified if the 'experts' are not ordinary citizens - who (s)elects them?
By what authority do they act in groups, perhaps disciplining those who violate ground rules?
How is this democracy? (On the other hand, consider the same issues when parties choose
mediators or arbitrators to assist them - choice and consent are considered the legitimating
criteria in simpler forms of dispute resolution). Should there be different forms ofprocess for
constitutive, ongoing and continuing versus ad hoc organizations or government agencies (see
Menkel-Meadow, Chapter 13, this volume)? What is the relation of deliberative democracy
events to formal governmental decision-making - legislation, regulation, court adjudication?
How are such methods of decision-making made accountable, both to those who participate
and to those who don't?
Conversely, those who argue for deliberative democracy processes suggest (subject to
empirical verification, see below) that decisions reached through such processes will be more
legitimate and acceptable, and lead tomore compliance because ofthe consent to, rather than the
'command' of, decisions reached. And, deliberative democracy, unlike formal governmental
processes, assumes that decisions can often be made contingent and be revisited as conditions
change and parties reconvene. As we will see in Volume III, these kinds of processes have
also been used to develop new forms of governance and dispute resolution in transitions
to democracies; these include truth and reconciliation commissions, new constitutional
formations and hybrid forms of domestic and international legal dispute resolution, with
new kinds of tribunals drawing from both domestic and international participation. Some of
the deliberative democracy efforts have also been directed towards the creation of networks
of global governance on particular issues such as environmentalism, corporate governance,
labour and food standards, among others (Slaughter, 2005).
Designing and Evaluating Dispute Resolution Systems
The insights of multi-party or complex dispute resolution have influenced the design of a
great variety of decisional processes, including those in the public sector reviewed above
in democratic decision-making and the private sector. In recent decades new processes
have developed, parallel to formal institutional processes in courts: mini-trials for private
mediation in complex cases; summary jury trials for shortened settlement 'trials' in court
(Menkel-Meadow et al., 201 1, ch. 12); claims resolution facilities for mass claims (Center for
Public Resources, 201 1) and for use within private organizations (employment and consumer
grievance systems within private corporations); and public institutions beyond the reach of
formal law (for example, employment grievance systems in international organizations like
the UN, World Bank, EU, IMF, Red Cross and others which are not subject to domestic or
any relevant international law). These new 'systems' of iterative dispute resolution involving
repeat players in organizational and governmental settings, as well as in newer settings such
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as human rights violations and multinational settings (explored more fully in Volume III).
have created a new field of dispute system designers (Ury. Brett and Goldberg. 1988: Smith
and Martinez, 2009) who, with expertise and knowledge based on the theory and practice of
complex dispute resolution, now assist parties in developing dispute systems
- or internal
dispute resolution (IDR) (Edelman, Erlanger and Lande. 1993) - for specialized settings, often
with 'tiered' choices of process which include direct negotiation, mediation and then some
decisional process such as arbitration or private adjudication. These systems are established
b> contract, by employment or personnel manual, or even through legal legitimating devices.
For example, the existence of an internal procedure for complaining about sexual harassment
or other discriminatory employment practices has been considered as a mitigation factor in
organizational liability for sexual harassment under US law (Polster. 201 1).
As these systems proliferate, efforts to study their effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy
empirically (as well as philosophically) have moved on to assess how the> operate. Do such
systems reduce conflict in workplaces or other repeat player settings (Bingham et al., 2009:
Freeman and Langbein, Chapter 17, this volume)? Do they make access to justice more
affordable and realizable? Do the\ create their own principles of resolution inside or outside
the rule of law? Are they acceptable to participants? Are they 'privatizing' justice (Genn,
2009)? Do they in fact enhance the quality of decision-making or the realization of political
participation (Ryfe, 2005)? Some of the essays in Part IV of this volume begin to address
these efforts to assess and evaluate the effects of this new process pluralism. Whatever is
presented here, there are likely to be new forms of complex dispute resolution developed in
the future for new kinds, numbers and configurations of disputes and conflicts. It is hoped
that the essays selected here can illuminate the significant issues to be considered in dispute
system design and assessment.
The Essays
Foundational Issues inMulti-Party Dispute Resolution: How Is It Different?
The essays in Part I of this volume set forth the theoretical issues that have distinguished
multi-party and multi-issue negotiation and conflict resolution from the foundational processes
explored in Volume I. In Chapter 1 Robert Mnookin explicitly contrasts the canons ofbilateral
negotiations to what might have to be reconsidered in multilateral negotiations, exploring
how many more barriers there may be to reaching multilateral agreements. Lawrence
Susskind, Robert Mnookin, Lukasz Rozdeiczer and Boyd Fuller (Chapter 2) elaborate on
what they have learned about the differences in multi-party negotiation from their teaching
of the subject, thereby introducing the practical applications of what w e are learning from
theory development. Next, James Sebenius. also of the Harvard Program on Negotiation (and
the Harvard Business School) explores, in Chapter 3. the important issue of how we must
sequence our discussions with other parties when we have several parties to choose from.
Do we start with those who are closest to agreeing with us, or do we trv to win over our
worst enemies first so that we can develop the coalitions and 'patterns of deference' that are
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necessary in the making of multi-party agreements? Cass Sunstein's essay (Chapter 4) has
been selected here to represent the growing social psychological study of how deliberations
in groups can 'go to extremes' and produce 'groupthink' rather than moving more towards
the 'average' or mean of the group. Good social science, then, informs us to beware of any
assumptions about human behaviour and moreover requires the adjustment ofprocess design
in group deliberations.
Jon Elster's essay on the contrasts between the American and French constitutional
formation process (Chapter 5) has become a classic in demonstrating how process design
can affect outcome. American constitutional processes were 'second best' in that they
were secretive, conducted in task and committee groups, and resulted in compromises
(continuation of slavery and undemocratic selection and representation in the Senate). The
French constitutional process, in contrast, was public, principled and conducted in plenary
form - a more 'perfect' and principled process. But, as Elster argues, the 'second best' process
used to form the American constitution has had much greater longevity (even with a bloody
civil war and numerous amendments). Which multi-party deliberative constitutional process
was better? Elster's work is a classic for considerations of modern complex negotiation and
dispute process design and has deeply affected my own work in specifying the conditions for
different kinds of dispute processes in different settings (see Menkel-Meadow, Chapter 13,
this volume).
Practice: Complex Dispute Processes andDecision-Making in Action
Part II of this volume demonstrates how theories of complex dispute resolution are applied. In
Chapter 6 Leigh Thompson explores processes of group decision-making - coalitions, voting
strategies - with a series of vivid examples. In Chapter 7 Jane Mansbridge, an important
political theorist of democratic and non-adversarial processes, and her colleagues, Janette
Hartz-Karp, Matthew Amengual and John Gastil, report on some empirical valuations ofhow
norms are created in deliberative settings. Next, Howard Raiffa and his colleagues (Chapter
8) rigorously present the consequences of different voting rules, demonstrating the fact that
no voting system is perfect; they include a discussion ofArrow's and Condorcet's important
work on how clear preferences cannot be obtained when there are multiple voters and show
that voting preferences have different intensities and ordering. In another classic application of
modern conflict resolution theory to important formative processes, Dana Lanksy (Chapter 9)
analyses the American constitutional process through the lens of twentieth-century negotiation
theory. Were the founding fathers aware ofall the theory and practice in these books? Did they
know what they were doing when they chose the processes described by Elster and created
their ground rules and decision rules? Were they strategic in their design to achieve particular
outcomes or did they separate what they thought were fair process considerations from the
outcomes those processes eventually produced?
Moving on to a more modern but equally complex setting, Hephzibah Levine (Chapter
10) provides a rich case study of how facilitated consensus-building processes were used to
achieve multi-party agreement in a highly conflict-ridden arena - negotiation ofnational park
and private property rights in Northern Israel - demonstrating that even with high-conflict
national and multicultural problems, 'smaller' incremental agreements can sometimes be
xxii Multi-Party Dispute Resolution, Democracy and Decision-Making II
reached (see also Blum, 2007). Lawrence Susskind's and Jeffrey Cmikshank's excerpt from
their 2006 book, Breaking Robert's Rules (Chapter 11), describes the rules for consensus-
building used in the dispute between 'Olives and Pines' (discussed by Levine in the previous
chapter), and suggests the substitution of simpler ground rules for deliberation than those
of Roberts Rules of Order used in most parliamentary settings. Finally, John Forester, as
a planning scholar, has long studied how these facilitative processes in complex decision
environments actually work. In Chapter 12 he explores some of the ethical dilemmas faced by
third-party facilitators (the mediators of Volume I and the multi-party dispute facilitators of
this volume) as they grapple with promises of 'neutrality' in highly contested value disputes.
Deliberative Democracy and Consensus-Building Processes
Part III elaborates on the specific application of our multi-party dispute resolution knowledge
to efforts to create more deliberative democracy in a variety of settings. Carrie Menkel-
Meadow (Chapter 13) explores how lawyers serving as mediators in the polity might be
especially good at managing the different kinds of discourse (rational-principled, interest-
based bargaining and emotive-affective) necessary to resolve a variety of disputes in a variety
of different settings (constitutive, permanent, ad hoc groups, open or closed settings and so
on - see the chart on page 368 for an elaboration of Elster 's observations on the effects
of the structure of process on outcomes). In Chapter 14 Lawrence Susskind and Connie
Ozawa provide one of the first assessments of how these processes actually work in public
dispute settings. Finally, David Straus (Chapter 1 5) provides good practical suggestions for
process and meeting management necessary to make democratic deliberative events function
effectively.
Evaluations ofMulti-Party Decision-Making andDeliberative Democracy
In Part IV several scholars begin to assess how knowledge about multi-party processes has
actually been applied in several settings. William Potapchuck and Jarle Crocker (Chapter
16) discuss the importance of following through on implementation plans in any consensus-
based agreement. Negotiation does not end with the signing of the agreement, especially in
multi-party settings where one party can effectively sabotage the whole complex agreement
achieved by many. In Chapter 17 Jody Freeman and Laura Langbein represent the growing
and contentious literature on whether these deliberative multi-party negotiation processes can
be used effectively within formal governmental regulatory processes. They respond to and
explain a wide variety of criticisms that have already been levelled at these processes and
provide their own arguments and empirical assessments of this conflict in the literature. Do
'negotiated rule-makings' actually reduce contested litigation? Are they more deliberative and
representative? Do they utilize fewer resources? Are they efficient? Do they result in better-
quality rules and regulations? Finally, Carrie Menkel-Meadow (Chapter 18) explores how
efforts to use the kind of large-scale town-hall meeting favoured by deliberative democracy
advocates failedmightily in the recent debates about healthcare in the United States. Menkel-
Meadow strongly suggests that anyone who reads these volumes would know that facilitating
such a major society-wide �multi-party negotiation' required much more knowledge, skill
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and experience than was exhibited in those political debates. She very much hopes that these
volumes will provide some insight into how such events might be better designed, managed
and evaluated.
Coda
A short Coda at the end of this volume provides a brief summary of, and introduction to, the
way in which these issues are being explored in transnational and multicultural settings when
dispute resolution crosses national and cultural boundaries and becomes even more complex.
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Coda
The essays in this volume suggest that the study and practice of multi-party dispute
resolution is difficult and complex in that barriers to making agreements with many parties
are significant and require rigorous analytic and behavioural attention, but also hopeful and
optimistic when deliberation and agreement facilitate hard-won, but legitimate and value-
creating outcomes. While pointing out the difficulties of coalitions, hold-outs, strategic
voting, and cognitive and social errors in group negotiations and decision-making, the essays
and authors represented here (and those for whom there was not enough room in these pages)
do represent a hope that, with further study and practice, human beings will become more
capable in advancing participatory decision-making and achieving better outcomes for human
flourishing in any number of important human endeavours, including: healthcare (Marcus
et al., 1995); community life (Merry and Milner, 1993); organizational decision-making
(Movius and Susskind, 2009); environmental policy formation (Bacow and Wheeler, 1984)
and planning (Forester, 1999); the workplace (Kochan and Lipsky, 2003); family life (Harper,
2004); political decision-making (Erdman and Susskind, 2008); and more conventional legal
disputes.
The development of the field of multi-party negotiation and dispute resolution as a
practical arm ofmore theoretical hopes formore participatory decision-making in law, policy,
community and work life is a testament to the desires of human beings to improve their
interactions, on both a process and a substantive basis - that is, in terms ofhow we talk to each
other and how we actually live with each other. As some practitioners in the field have said,
we seek to look for both common and 'higher' ground (Dukes, Piscolish and Stephens, 2000)
when we work together to integrate interests and needs so that group interests can be satisfied
without necessarily compromising self-interests. Indeed, much of the field ofmodern dispute
resolution is founded on the idea that 'unnecessary compromises' (Menkel-Meadow, 2006)
are not needed to forge solutions to problems that can achieve added or joint gain. People
negotiate precisely because they cannot do things on their own and need others to help them
achieve their goals.
While adding parties to negotiation can, at times, make things more difficult and does add
complexities to the conflict resolution processes, adding parties to a negotiation can often add
resources, increase the number of ideas available and provide specialization or diversity of
implementation. Indeed, a new body of significant theoretical (and applied) work has focused
on the importance of the variety and diversity of ideas to solve governance problems and deal
with complex social and legal issues - a 'constitution of democratic experimentalism.' (Dorf
and Sabel, 1998). As one evocative trope in our field suggests, if you are going on a long
overnight hike up a mountain you will probably want to be accompanied by many people
with different expertises - a map-reader or navigator, a fire-builder, a cook, a storyteller, a
medically expert person, a musician, a hunter (if necessary), a botanist to identify flora, a
tall and strong person (to hang rucksacks in trees if there are bears) and, of course, a dispute
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resolver to organize all these different people and ensure that they work effectively together.
Multiple parties, issues and expertise thus diversify the ways in which we can organize human
life, providing greater opportunities to achieve good instrumental results, but they must also
be well coordinated from a process and planning perspective.
The field ofmulti-party dispute resolution, like its precursor in basic negotiation theory,
seeks to examine whether there are basic ideas or memes that we need to be aware of in this
work - concepts like coalitions, hold-outs, consensus, ground rules and decision rules - which
are both processual and substantive. Can we improve any possible outcome by listening to
what other parties want and trying to add that in? Can we think ofmulti-party negotiation as
'additive' and not necessarily compromising or distributive (Menkel-Meadow, 2006)? How
must process be managed differently in multi-party settings? The following factors need to be
taken into account:
� Meetings - all public or some private?
� Relations of parties to each other - trust, scepticism?
� Identification of stakeholders and representatives - who should participate?
� Information-sharing strategies
� Role(s) of third-party mediators, facilitators, deciders
� Voting rules
� How to manage multiple issues with shifting needs and interests of parties
� Decision or other outcomes? ('Understanding' or learning, rather than formal
agreement, contingent agreements - when reopened?)
� How can these issues be simultaneously planned for and simultaneously remain
contingent andflexible for maximization of idea generation?
This volume has illustrated many sites where such processes have been productively used
to form public policy, resolve complex lawsuits and competing interests over scarce resources,
and form new institutions, organizations and even nations (in constitutional processes). In
Volume III we will explore how these processes have been, and can be, used in international
settings to advance global problem-solving. We will also look at the particular problems of
seeking to negotiate with parties from different cultures, nationalities and nation-states, further
complexifying our already complex forms of negotiation, mediation, facilitation and dispute
resolution. One of the major challenges facing this field is whether there are (as in negotiation
theory) generalizable and more or less universal concepts that apply across different kinds
of matters or whether complex, multi-party dispute resolution requires particularly context-
driven theory and practice.
Multi-party theories and practice also have to deal with issues of instability and dynamic
change. What happens when coalitions are abandoned or defected from? How do we assess
whether we can trust someone who is working 'with' or 'against' us? How do people in groups
regard each other - with motives of altruism and reciprocity, or of distrust and defection
(Axelrod, 1984; Burch, 2009)? In what contexts do these orientations vary? Are there ways to
enforce commitments made to or in groups? How can we structure contingent agreements so
that we can build in reopener clauses when conditions change or parties' needs and interests
(or alliances) change? How do we monitor agreements - test and check their implementation,
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punish or reward for compliance issues, evaluate and assess the effectiveness of particular
solutions or agreements (Innes, 1999)? How do we handle the internal integrity of groups -
what happens when groups start to divide or splinter in larger multi-party settings?
In their essay in this volume Larry Susskind, Bob Mnookin, Lukasz Rozdeiczer and
Boyd Fuller (Chapter 2) suggest that in understanding multi-party processes it is important to
always think about them from two perspectives - not only that of an interested party engaged
in the dispute or negotiable issues at hand, but also that of a third party (outsider) tasked with
developing a process to resolve or deal with the complex negotiation. This inside-outside
perspective can further enrich both theoretical observations and practical interventions in
complex dispute resolution. One of the basic purposes of this volum e has been to suggest that
all modern lawyers, politicians, organizational leaders and participants in group life should
learn the theories about, and best practices for, good process design and facilitation. Empirical
research does seem to suggest that when parties in conflict assist in the design of their own
process they are more likely to judge the process as fair (Lind and Tyler, 1988; Burch, 2011)
and outcomes are more likely to be complied with (Innes, 1999). We are all meeting managers
now (Harvard Business School Press, 2006; Susskind and Cruikshank, 2006; Arthur, Carlson
and Moore, 1999).
Those who have developed the outside planner-designer perspective have now produced
their own set of concepts, memes and prescriptions for dispute system design, based on the
insights gained from dispute resolution theory and its implementation in a wide variety of
iterative and repeat conflicts ofwhich only a few are explored here (Costantino and Merchant,
1996; Bingham, Smith and Martinez, 2012). Some of the issues that this field now addresses
are: how much process is due each individual in an organizational setting; what variations and
choices of processes there should be; and what are the relations of private justice or dispute
resolution systems to more formal governmental institutions, including courts (in class action
and other case management), legislatures (in policy and rule formation) and administrative
tribunals (in negotiated rule-making exercises) (Harter, 1982; Coglianese, 1997).
As we increasingly live, work and have conflicts - aswell asmake peaceable and productive
new relationships, transactions and entities (Peppet, 2004) - with each other in groups, it
has become more and more essential that we understand the nature of group behaviour and
group (andmulti-party) conflict resolution. This volume has described and illustrated some of
the key ideas and practice protocols for effective (and defective) group deliberation, conflict
resolution and decision-making.
In Volume III we will apply what we have learned about these processes to situations
ofmulticultural and multinational diversity, when the stakes for the continuation of human
life on the planet make our need to engage in productive transnational and complex dispute
resolution even more essential. Whether our observations, theories and aspirations to improve
human communication, information-processing, creative problem-solving and collaboration
can be 'scaled up' to the global level remains to be seen and evaluated. And, as always, we
will have to ask whether it is possible to develop general principles, concepts and protocols
of action that are generalizable or universal, or whether, in the transnational context, it will be
even more likely that we will have to adapt our process learning to cultural and other diverse
contextual variations.
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